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labour market assimilation of refugees through two mechanisms: first, the local job 
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for local jobs decreases with place utility. We argue that spatial dispersal decreases 
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to large local reservation wages. We investigate both mechanisms empirically and 
test the predictions of the theoretical model by evaluating the employment effects of 
the Danish spatial dispersal policy carried out 1986-1998. 
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Abstract
We argue that spatial dispersal inﬂuences labour market assimilation of refugees
through two mechanisms: ﬁrst, the local job oﬀer arrival rate and, second, place
utility. Our partial search model with simultaneous job and residential location
search predicts that the reservation wage for local jobs decreases with place utility.
We argue that spatial dispersal decreases average place utility of refugees which
decreases the transition rate into ﬁrst job due to large local reservation wages. We
investigate both mechanisms empirically and test the predictions of the theoretical
model by evaluating the employment eﬀects of the Danish spatial dispersal policy
carried out 1986-1998.
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1I. Introduction
Spatial dispersal policies aimed at asylum seekers and refugees are commonly believed
to promote their labour market assimilation. This study provides theoretical and empirical
evidence that spatial dispersal policies may in fact hamper labour market assimilation of
refugees and asylum seekers.1
Mandatory spatial dispersal policies that direct all newly-arrived refugees and asylum
seekers away from immigrant-dense metropolitan areas are implemented in several Euro-
pean countries, e.g. UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark. Voluntary
spatial dispersal policies are used in other European countries, e.g. Sweden. The ratio-
nale for a spatial dispersal policy is in general threefold; ﬁrst, to distribute the ﬁnancial
and social costs of receipt of asylum seekers and refugees between local authorities (the
public ﬁnance motive); second, to avoid increasing pressure on housing in areas that are
already under stress (the housing motive); and third, to increase the speed of acquisition
of host-country-speciﬁc human capital, such as language skills and knowledge about the
host country through increased interaction with the majority population (the assimilation
motive).
Opponents to spatial dispersal policies claim, however, that lack of free location choice
increases secondary migration rates, i.e. relocation within the host country, which will
undo some of the intended results of the policy. This claim is supported by evidence for
the United States [Forbes 1985], Norway [Djuve and Kavli 2000], Sweden [Aaslund 2001]
and Denmark [Hummelgaard et al. 1995; Damm 2005a] which report relocation rates
of 33-38% of placed refugees three-four years after initial settlement, higher relocation
rates out of rural areas and secondary migration towards towns and cities. Furthermore,
Edin et al. [2004] conclude that refugees dispersed according to the Swedish mandatory
spatial dispersal policy in place until 1994, the ’Whole of Sweden’ strategy, experienced
long-run losses (in terms of earnings, idleness and welfare receipt) due to the dispersal
policy. Speciﬁcally, their estimates suggest that the probability of being idle eight years
after immigration would have been 19 percentage points higher if refugees had stayed
in the assigned municipalities compared to the situation of free location choice prior to
implementation of the dispersal policy. However, they stress that the secondary migration
pattern lowered the potential long-run losses of the policy because of the tendency for
refugees to leave regions with bad employment prospects.
This study provides a theoretical model for analysis of how spatial dispersal policy
aﬀects employment outcomes of asylum seekers and refugees. In addition, it provides
1The Geneva Convention from 1951 deﬁnes a refugee as a person who due to well-founded fear for
persecution because of his race, religion, nationality, belonging to a certain social group or political views
is staying outside his country of citizenship and who is not able to - or due to such fear does not want to
- seek that country’s protection.
2empirical evidence of the employment eﬀects of the Danish spatial dispersal policy in
place between 1986 and 1998.
We argue that spatial dispersal policies may aﬀect job ﬁnding rates of asylum seekers
and refugees through two mechanisms. First, settlement in sparsely populated regions
without immigrant networks may give rise to diﬀerent job-oﬀer arrival rates than set-
tlement in immigrant-dense metropolitan areas. Whether such a diﬀerence exists is an
empirical question. Second, lack of free initial location choice is likely to decrease refugees’
initial place utility. We investigate the eﬀect of low place utility on the job ﬁnding rate by
formulating a search model in which non-employed individuals simultaneously search for
a job (locally and outside the local labour market) and for a better location of residence.
Our model predicts that the lower the current place utility, the higher are the transition
rates into a new region of residence and into non-local employment and the lower is the
transition rate into local employment. We argue that the local reservation wage eﬀect is
likely to dominate the non-local reservation wage eﬀect. If so, lower place utility decreases
the overall job ﬁnding rate while acceptance of a residential oﬀer in a new region increases
the overall job ﬁnding rate.
We test the hypotheses of the model using administrative register data on refugees
subject to the Danish spatial dispersal policy. Speciﬁcally, we estimate the eﬀects of initial
location characteristics and the average eﬀect of relocation on the transition rate into ﬁrst
job. We correct for selection into relocation by joint estimation of the duration of the
ﬁrst non-employment spell and the duration of a residential spell, using the timing-of-
events method, i.e. a bivariate mixed proportional hazard model. Our empirical results
show, ﬁrst, that the hazard rate into ﬁrst job decreases with the local population size and
the local number of immigrants. These ﬁndings support the implementation of a spatial
dispersal policy in Denmark. Second, on average relocation has a large and positive eﬀect
on the hazard rate into ﬁrst job. This eﬀect provides evidence in favour of our hypothesis
that spatial dispersal leads to lower average place utility and thereby reduces local and
overall job ﬁnding rates. Simulation results show that in the Danish case the latter eﬀect
dominates the former; the Danish spatial dispersal policy may in fact have slowed down
labour market assimilation of asylum seekers and refugees.
II. The Danish Spatial Dispersal Policy
1986 marks the start of the ﬁrst Danish spatial dispersal policy on refugees and asylum
seekers who had just received a permit to stay for reasons of asylum.2 Henceforth, we refer
2Until June 2002 Denmark gave asylum to Convention refugees, i.e. persons who were deﬁned as
refugees according to the Geneva Convention from 1951, and to foreigners who were not deﬁned as
refugees according to the Geneva Convention, but who for similar reasons as stated in the Convention
3to such recognized refugees and asylum seekers as refugees. The Danish Government urged
the Danish Refugee Council to implement the dispersal policy after a surge of refugees
in the mid-eighties made it increasingly diﬃcult for the Council to satisfy the location
preferences of most new refugees for accommodation in the larger cities. The policy was
in force until 1999 under the charge of the Council. The Council’s assignment policy
aimed at promoting an equal share of refugees in all counties. At the county level, the
Council aimed at attaining an equal share of refugees in municipalities (local authority
districts) with suitable facilities for reception such as housing, educational institutions,
employment opportunities, and co-ethnics. In practice, these dispersal criteria implied
that refugees were provided with permanent housing in cities and towns and to a lesser
extent in the rural districts [Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs 1996]. In 1987, 243 out of a total
of 275 municipalities in Denmark had received refugees [Danish Refugee Council 1987].
Dispersal was voluntary in the sense that only refugees who were unable to ﬁnd hous-
ing themselves were subject to the dispersal policy. However, the take-up rate was high;
between 1986 and 1997 approximately 90% of refugees were provided with permanent
housing by the Council (or after 1995 by a local government) under the terms of the dis-
persal policy [Annual Reports of the Danish Refugee Council 1986-1994 and the Council’s
internal administrative statistics for 1995-1998].
Once settled, refugees participated in Danish language courses during an introductory
period of 18 months while receiving social assistance. Refugees were urged to stay in
the assigned municipality during the entire introductory period. However, there were no
relocation restrictions. Refugees could move away from the municipality of assignment at
any time, in so far as they could ﬁnd alternative housing elsewhere. Receipt of welfare
was unconditional on residing in the assigned municipality.
The dispersal policy did, at least in the short run, inﬂuence the location pattern
of refugees. In 1993 the settlement pattern of refugees resembled that of the Danish
population and diﬀered greatly from that of non-western immigrants.3
In 1999, a new spatial dispersal policy was implemented in Denmark. It aimed at
increasing employment assimilation of refugees by means of mandatory and increased
spatial dispersal and an extended introduction programme supplied by the municipality
of assignment and by making receipt of social assistance in the ﬁrst three years conditional
on residing in the assigned municipality [Law no. 474 passed July 1, 1998].
or other weighty reasons should not be required to return to the home country (’de facto’ refugees).
[Coleman and Wadensjö 1999, 249].
333% of refugees and 26% of the Danish population lived in the capital or its suburbs while as much
as 71% of non-western immigrants lived there. 56% of refugees and 59% of the Danish population lived
in towns outside the capital as opposed to only 24% of non-western immigrants. The remaining shares
lived in rural districts [Danish Refugee Council 1993].
4Damm [2005b] argues that the Danish spatial dispersal policy 1986-1998 gave rise
to a random initial residential distribution of refugees who were provided permanent
housing by the Council, conditional on seven characteristics of the individual at the time
of assignment: family size, health (in need of special treatment of medical or mental health
problems), special educational needs, the location of close relatives, nationality, year of
immigration (over time it became increasingly diﬃcult for the Council to ﬁnd housing in
the larger and medium-sized towns) as well as reluctance to accept assignment to a non-
preferred county. These governing factors suggest that non-single refugees with special
health treatment and educational needs and refugees with close family in Denmark near
whom they were determined to live and who arrived early in the observation period were
most likely to realise their preferred settlement option. Three of these characteristics
are observed in Danish administrative registers (described in Section V): family status
(measured by marital status and number of children), nationality, and year of immigration.
Moreover, Damm [2005b] argues that age and nationality may be decent proxies for special
educational needs, and that nationality and size of the ethnic stock may be decent proxies
for whether the individual had relatives in Denmark at the time of assignment. In contrast,
the registers do not contain any decent proxy for need of special treatment for medical
or mental health problems. Note, however, that there was no systematic mental health
examination of refugees at the time of assignment. Furthermore, since mental health
problems are taboos, they tend to be treated at a late stage, if treated at all. Whether
a refugee was in need of special mental treatment at the time of assignment is therefore
likely to have had little inﬂuence on initial settlement. Similarly, the last-mentioned
characteristic is probably of minor importance: the combination of high take-up rates and
low reassignment rates indicates that only a small fraction of the refugees insisted on
living in a particular area.
In the empirical analysis we thus condition on ﬁve out of the six characteristics of
the individuals that may have had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on their intial settlement. This
allows us to treat the initial residential location of a refugee as otherwise exogenous.
III. Theoretical Model
In this section, we formulate a partial search model to investigate how spatial dispersal
policies on refugees aﬀect their labour market assimilation.4
Knowledge of the main features of spatial dispersal policies is a prerequisite for formu-
lation of such a model. Past and current spatial dispersal policies on refugees implemented
in Europe have two features in common. First, the authorities decide the initial location
4For more details on the model, see Damm and Rosholm [2003].
5of individuals subject to the policy. Second, the initial location tends to be a location
outside immigrant-dense cities.
Spatial dispersal policies may inﬂuence job oﬀer arrival rates of individuals subject
to the policy if individual job oﬀer arrival rates depend on location choice, both at the
regional and the neighbourhood level. Regional characteristics that may aﬀect individual
job oﬀer arrival rates include regional unemployment rates that could diﬀer systematically
between immigrant-dense cities and more sparsely populated regions without immigrants.
Whether this is the case is an empirical issue to be evaluated in any given context. Neigh-
bourhood characteristics that potentially inﬂuence individual job oﬀer arrival rates include
the level of segregation of immigrants in the neighbourhood of residence. Several compet-
ing theories exist about how settlement in an immigrant-dense neighbourhood aﬀects job
oﬀer arrival rates of immigrants. The spatial mismatch hypothesis [Kain 1968; Ihlanfeldt
and Sjoquist 1990] and the hypothesis about slower acquisition of host-country-speciﬁc
human capital [Chiswick 1991; Chiswick and Miller 1995, 1996; Lazear 1999] predict that
settlement in immigrant enclaves aﬀects immigrant labour market outcomes negatively.
In contrast, theories about human capital externalities [Borjas 1995, 1998; Cutler and
Glaeser 1997], social network eﬀects [Portes 1987; Lazear 1999; Bertrand et al. 2000]
and peer group eﬀects [Coleman 1966; Wilson 1987; Case and Katz 1991; Borjas 1995;
Glaeser et al. 1996] predict that settlement in immigrant enclaves aﬀects immigrant
labour market outcomes positively or negatively depending on the socioeconomic charac-
teristics of enclave members. Hence, theoretically the employment eﬀect of settlement in
immigrant-dense neighbourhoods is ambiguous in sign and therefore ought to be investi-
gated empirically in a given context.
For these reasons the theoretical model formulated by us ignores that spatial dispersal
may aﬀect individual job oﬀer arrival rates by aﬀecting the job oﬀer arrival rate in the
local labour market. Our objective is instead to formulate a model that enables us to
predict how the lack of free location choice aﬀects job ﬁnding rates of individuals subject
to the policy.
A related literature exists, which explains job and residential search behaviour for
unemployed and employed workers in general. Many of these studies rely on a sequential
ordering of the decision to change residence or job. So individuals search either for jobs
given their residence or for a new residence given their job. Examples of the former
models include Sugden [1980], Simpson [1980], Van Ophem [1991], Van den Berg [1992],
Rouwendal and Rietveld [1994] and Molho [2001]. The latter models include Weinberg
[1979], Weinberg et al. [1981], Smith and Clark [1982], Clark and Flowerdew [1982] and
Pickles and Davies [1991]. However, a theory which does not rely on such sequential
ordering of the decision to change job or residence is better suited for understanding the
interaction between the two decisions. Such a simultaneous search model is developed by
6Van Ommeren et al. [1997, 2000]. In their model, individuals maximise life-time utility
by moving through diﬀerent labour market and residential location states, taking into
consideration that moving from one state to another is costly. Optimal strategies are
derived both for employed and non-employed individuals giving rise to four reservation
value strategies, for job moves/acceptance and residential relocation for employed and
unemployed individuals, respectively. One of their main conclusions based on the search
model is that the reservation wages for employed and non-employed depend on labour
market characteristics as well as housing market characteristics. That is also the case for
t h er e s e r v a t i o np l a c eu t i l i t y .
The model by Van Ommeren et al. [1997, 2000] constitutes a good description of the
interaction between job and residential mobility for native born individuals. Refugees,
however, may initially diﬀer from natives, e.g. by lack of information necessary for con-
ducting job search outside a deﬁned local labour market. Furthermore, spatial dispersal
policies aim at labour market assimilation of refugees within the region of assignment.
For these two reasons, the distinction between the local labour market and the non-local
labour market is important for analysis of employment eﬀects of spatial dispersal policies
on refugees. The model by Van Ommeren et al. [1997, 2000] does not distinguish between
local and non-local job search. The optimal search strategies for refugees may therefore
be diﬀerent from those described in Van Ommeren et al. [1997, 2000].
In our model refugees begin searching at the time of receipt of a residence permit.
Individuals may search in three dimensions. First, individuals can search for a new resi-
dential location instead of the location of assignment. Second, they may search for a job
locally, i.e. within commuting distance of the present residence, and ﬁnally, they may
search for employment outside the local labour market.
Individuals face a set of alternative residential locations and a set of alternative em-
ployment opportunities. The individual examines the costs and beneﬁts of any residential
location or job oﬀer, taking into account once-only costs associated with changing residen-
tial location. As a non-local job is a job situated outside feasible commuting distance by
assumption, the individual will have to move in order to accept such a job oﬀer. In order
to avoid further technical complexities, we assume that a job oﬀer in the non-local labour
market carries with it a residential oﬀer, that is, it is a draw from a bivariate distribution
of job and residential oﬀers.
Individuals derive utility from income y and place utility r5.T h e i n c o m e i s b while
non-employed (e.g. social assistance) and the wage w while employed. The instantaneous
utility u experienced by an individual is assumed to be a linear function of y and r,
5The concept of ’place utility’ was developed by Wolpert who deﬁned it as ”a positive or negative
quantity, expressing respectively the individual’s satisfaction or dissatisfaction with respect to that place”
[Wolpert 1965, 162].
7u(y,r)=y + r (1)
where r is suitably normalized. The cross-derivatives are assumed to be zero because we
want to focus on the ’pure’ dependencies between the reservation strategies and not on
dependencies arising from interaction terms in the utility function. The individual faces
once-only costs, c, of changing residence.
From the individual’s point of view, the economy consists of two labour markets, the
local labour market which contains all jobs within commuting distance from the current
location of residence, and the non-local labour market which contains all jobs in the rest
of the country. We assume that job oﬀers in both regions arrive according to a Poisson
process with arrival rate αl in the local labour market and αn in the non-local labour
market. Note that a job oﬀer in the non-local labour market carries with it a residential
location oﬀer, because an individual cannot work outside the local labour market without
changing residence. Furthermore, individuals receive residence oﬀers from outside the
local labour market (with no associated job oﬀers) which arrive according to a Poisson
process at rate β.
When a job oﬀer is accepted, the individual keeps the job forever. Moreover, once a
job is accepted, the individual also stops searching for a new residence and thus settles
down forever. This implies that the value of holding a job paying the wage w at a location





where ρ is the discount rate.
A residence oﬀer is characterised by the place utility r, which is a random draw from
a distribution Fr(r). A job is characterised by the wage w and by its location. Local job
oﬀers are random draws from a distribution Fw(w). Non-local job oﬀers are random draws





r, respectively. For simplicity we assume that fw,r(w,r)=fw(w)fr(r).
The value of being unemployed is the discounted expected lifetime utility derived
from income ﬂows and current place utilities, denoted by the value function V (r0),w h e r e
r0 denotes the place utility at the initial (exogenous) location. Note that under the
assumption of random initial location, which is basically what the spatial dispersal policies
conducted in Denmark aspire at, the initial place utility is a random draw from Fr(r).
The ﬂow value of being non-employed with initial place utility r0 is6
6Details of the derivations as well as the proofs of all propositions made below can be found in Damm
and Rosholm [2003].
8ρV (r0)=b + r0 + αlEw max[0,W(w,r0) − V (r0)] (3)
+αnEw,r max[0,W(w,r) − c − V (r0)]
+βEr max[0,V(r) − c − V (r0)].
The interpretation of the asset equation 3 is as follows. The ﬂow value of being non-
employed is equal to the sum of four components: The instantaneous utility of the current
income and residence, the option value of local job search, the option value of non-local job
search, and the option value of residential search. The ﬂow value of being non-employed
can be shown to be increasing in current place utility.









is a set of reservation wages for jobs outside the commuting area. These are
conditional on the current place utility, r0, but also on the place utility associated with
the job oﬀer, that is, there is a distribution of reservation wages over associated place
utilities. Finally, r∗(r0) is the reservation place utility for residence oﬀers. In the rest of
the paper, the dependence of the reservation values on current reservation place utility is
suppressed for notational simplicity.
These reservation strategies imply that job and residential mobility of non-employed
persons are described by transition rates which are the products of an oﬀer arrival rate
and an acceptance probability.
The transition rate into a local job is thus
hl = αl [1 − Fw(w
∗)] (4)






The transition rate into employment, h, is the sum of the local and non-local job
ﬁnding rate
h = hl + hn (6)
Exploiting the reservation value properties, elaborating further on the value function
equations using integration by parts allows us to rewrite the asset equation as


















∂V(r)/∂r · [1 − Fr(r)]dr (7)
We now have the following results:
Proposition 1 r∗ increases with r0.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. The higher current place utility, the
better must a residence oﬀer be for an individual to accept it. Thus, living in a location
which oﬀers a low place utility implies a low reservation place utility and consequently a
high transition rate into a new region of residence, hr.
Proposition 2 Rw|r increases with r0,w h i l ew∗ decreases with r0.
Thus, living in a place which oﬀers a low place utility implies a low reservation wage for
jobs involving a residential move and consequently a high transition rate into such jobs,
hn. The intuition for the result is that the lower current place utility, the less attached is
an individual to his current residential location, and consequently, for a given place utility
oﬀer r, the lower will the wage oﬀers from outside the local labour market have to be to
attract him to the job.
Turning to the second result, an increase in the current place utility decreases the
reservation wage for local jobs, because the option value of receiving a non-local job oﬀer
and of receiving a residential oﬀer both decrease. Thus, living in a place which yields low
place utility implies that an individual must be ’compensated’ for the low place utility by
a high wage. Therefore, the individual will set a high reservation wage in the local job
market and consequently have a low local job ﬁnding rate, hl.











0 [1 − Fw(Rw|r)]dFr(r)+
β
ρ [1 − Fr(r∗)]
10The proposition states that the transition rate into employment increases with current
place utility, if the increase in the transition rate into local jobs, resulting from the decline
in the local job reservation wage, w∗, exceeds the decline in the transition rate into jobs
outside the local labour market, resulting from the increase in the national job reservation
wage, Rw|r. In the case of the Danish labour market, this derivative is likely to be positive,
as the transition rate into local jobs is close to 100 times larger than the transition rate
into jobs outside the local labour market [Munch et al. 2005]. Hence, we would expect
the impact on the local job reservation wage to dominate.
These comparative static results can be used for analysing the implications of a spatial
dispersal policy for refugees. Spatial dispersal is likely to imply relatively low average
values of current place utility, r0, due to lack of an ethnic network and lack of inﬂuence on
the choice of location. Since refugees are not free to choose where to live, some of them will
ﬁnd themselves in locations to which they attribute very low place utility. Proposition 1
then implies that, ap r i o r i ,spatial dispersal policies are likely to lead to lower reservation
place utilities and consequently higher relocation rates, especially in case of mandatory
spatial dispersal. The high subsequent migration rates of refugees who had initially been
subject to spatial dispersal found in empirical studies for the United States, Sweden,
Norway and Denmark are supportive evidence in favour of this hypothesis.
Moreover, Proposition 2 implies that, ap r i o r i , spatial dispersal policies - low average
values of current place utility - are expected to lead to lower transition rates into local
employment due to higher local reservation wages and to higher transition rates into
employment outside the local labour market due to lower reservation wages in the non-
local labour market. Hence, spatial dispersal policies have the likely implication that a
better local wage oﬀer is required to compensate the individual for the foregone option
value from non-local job search and residential search.
The implication of Proposition 3 is that the eﬀect of spatial dispersal policies on the job
ﬁnding rate is ambiguous. However, empirically the eﬀect is likely to be negative, at least
for most European labour markets, which are characterised by much higher transition
rates into local jobs than the transition rates into jobs outside the local labour market
[Munch et al. 2005].
IV. Empirical Model
A duration model is a natural empirical counterpart of a search model. We simplify
the empirical model relative to the theoretical model by ignoring the distinction between
local and non-local jobs. The reason is that our empirical objective is to estimate the
eﬀect of the spatial dispersal policy on the overall job ﬁnding rate.
IV.A. Econometric Speciﬁcation
11The random variable Tu denotes the duration since receipt of residence permit until
the ﬁrst job. This is our key variable of interest. Let the random variable Tr denote
the time spent in a given municipality of residence. In addition, m is an index denoting
whether a residential spell is the ﬁrst, second, third up to the Mth residential spell for that
person. Finally, let xu and xrm be time-invariant vectors of observed covariates (initial
values) and vu and vr represent unobserved covariates.
The transition rate into a new residential location and the transition rate into ﬁrst job
are assumed to be given by Mixed Proportional Hazard (MPH) functions,
hr(trm|xrm,v r)=λr(trm) · ϕr(xrm) · exp(vr),m=1 ,...,M (8)
hu(tu|trm,xu,v u)=λu(tu) · ϕu(xu) · exp(δ1I{m =2 })
·exp(δ2I{m>2}) · exp(vu) (9)
where xrm includes a set of indicators for whether it is the ﬁrst, second, ..., mth
residential spell of the individual. I(.) is an indicator function for the event in brackets.
The hazard rate into ﬁrst job is consequently allowed to change at the moment at which
an individual makes a residential move. δm,m=1 ,2, are the main parameters of interest
since the estimate of δm is the causal eﬀe c to fr e l o c a t i o no nt h ej o bﬁnding rate and can
be interpreted as an average eﬀect of treatment on the treated. In the empirical analysis
we restrict the causal eﬀect of relocations subsequent to the ﬁrst relocation to be the
same since very few persons move more than twice. However, we do allow the eﬀect of
a relocation to vary with time since the relocation happened. That is, the parameters
δ1 and δ2 are allowed to vary with time since relocation (this dependence is suppressed
above for simplicity).
The likelihood contribution of a residential spell and of the ﬁr s tn o n - e m p l o y m e n ts p e l l
is, conditional on observed and unobserved covariates,









hu(s|trm,x u,v u)ds] (11)
respectively, where dr and du are non-censoring indicators. A residential spell is treated
as right-censored if a person ﬁnds a job before making a (further) relocation. The total









Lrm(trm|xrm,v r)dG(Vu,V r) (12)
12where G(·)i st h ej o i n tC D Ff o rVu and Vr,a n dM is the number of residential spells an
individual experiences before ﬁnding the ﬁrst job.
We assume the distributions of the unobserved terms to be discrete with two-by-two




r denote the mass-points of Vu and
Vr, respectively. The associated probabilities are as follows:
Pr(Vu = v
1
u,V r = v
1
r)=p1 Pr(Vu = v
1





u,V r = v
1
r)=p3 Pr(Vu = v
2
u,V r = v
2
r)=p4 (14)
with 0≤ pi ≤ 1 for i =1,...,4, and
P4
i=1 pi =1 .We normalise the distribution of the
unobservables by letting exp(v1
j)=1for j = u,r.
The observed part of the individual-speciﬁc hazard function is speciﬁed as: ϕj(Xl) =
exp(X0
lβj),j= u,r and l = u,rm. The baseline hazard rates are assumed to be piecewise
constant, i.e. λj(t)=e x p ( αjk),k=1 ,...,Kj, j = u,r, where Kj is the number of intervals
for the baseline hazard of spell type j. The length of each baseline interval is chosen on
the basis of the empirical hazard functions for exit to ﬁrst job and exit from municipality
of residence presented in Section V.
IV.B. Identiﬁcation
Abbring and Van den Berg [2003] provide identiﬁcation results for this model, which
has become known as the ’timing-of-events’ model. The main identiﬁc a t i o ni s s u ei sh o w
to disentangle the eﬀect of relocation from the selection eﬀect. If individuals who move
at time tr have relatively short (long) durations, tu, it can be for two reasons: Either the
individual ’treatment’ eﬀect is positive or treated individuals have relatively high values of
vu and would have found a job relatively fast anyway. The authors show that given an as-
sumption of no anticipation of the realisation of the treatment (relocation), the two eﬀects
can be disentangled without resorting to exclusion restrictions. However, individuals are
allowed to know the probability distribution of time until relocation. The identiﬁcation
argument is based on exogenous variation in the timing of events. If there is exogenous
variation in the timing of relocation, it can be identiﬁed separately from the selection
eﬀect caused by unobserved individual heterogeneity. The reason is that in that case
the eﬀect of relocation does not appear in the non-employment hazard before relocation
has occurred while unobserved heterogeneity is constant over the non-employment spell.
Additional identiﬁcation requirements are independence of xr and xu from vi,i= u,r
and an assumption of existence of the ﬁr s tm o m e n to fvi unless multiple observations are
available for each vi pair, which they are not in the present context.
We believe that the assumption of no anticipation is approximately satisﬁed in the
present context due to housing market regulations and frictions faced by refugees. Refugees
13have limited access to owner-occupied housing because of liquidity constraints and the law
prohibiting foreigners with less than ﬁve years of residence in Denmark buying real estate
in Denmark. This may explain why only 6% of movers in the refugee sample described in
Section V lived in owner-occupied housing after the move. Turning to the private rental
market, it is characterised by extensive rent control which results in queues. Refugees in
particular are likely to have to queue for a long time because of lack of a Danish network
to facilitate access, and due to potential discrimination by private landlords. In contrast,
refugees have easy access to social housing because socially and economically disadvan-
taged individuals with housing problems have priority to 25% of vacant social housing
units. Renters in the social housing sector typically have 3 months’ notice. Therefore,
an apartment vacancy is often announced only 2-2.5 months prior to the apartment va-
cancy. An individual who wants to apply for a vacant apartment is therefore likely to
receive notice about the vacance approximately two months before the actual apartment
vacancy. Remember that individuals are allowed to know the distribution of residential
spell durations, just not the actual date of relocation too long in advance. In the present
context with fairly long residential spells, 2 months’ anticipation is of minor importance.
V. Data
V.A. Refugee Sample
Our micro data on refugees is extracted from longitudinal administrative registers of
Statistics Denmark on the immigrant population in Denmark 1984-2000. Our sample
selection criteria result in a refugee sample with information on 28,056 individuals. Ide-
ally, this sample should cover observations on all adult refugees who were assigned to a
municipality by the Council under the terms of the spatial dispersal policy carried out
from 1986 to 1998. However, information on admission category of immigrants and the
assignment municipality of refugees is missing in the registers. We take account of the ﬁrst
issue by applying an algorithm based on country of origin and the ﬁrst year of residence
permit to Denmark to extract individuals from the 17 largest refugee-sending countries.
The algorithm was constructed from oﬃcial ﬁgures on the annual number of residence
permits granted to refugees by country of origin. Solving the second data issue is further
complicated by the fact that refugees may initially have lived in temporary housing in
proximity of the municipality to which they were later assigned, on average after 1 year.
We identify the municipality of assignment by using a rather complicated algorithm which
we constructed based on information on the Council’s internal administrative statistics on
temporary housing. We deﬁne the ﬁrst municipality of residence observed in the registers
as a municipality of temporary housing if the person relocates to another municipality
within the county within one year after receipt of residence permit. Otherwise the ﬁrst
14municipality is deﬁned as the municipality of assignment. Furthermore, we want to ex-
clude family-reuniﬁed immigrants from refugee-sending countries, because they were not
subject to spatial dispersal, unless they immigrated shortly after their spouse. We there-
fore exclude immigrants from refugee-sending countries, who at the time of immigration
were married to either 1) a Dane, 2) an immigrant from a non-refugee-sending country
or 3) an immigrant from a refugee-sending country who had immigrated at least one year
earlier. Unfortunately, the registers do not allow us to exclude the 10% of refugees who
turned down the Council’s oﬀer of housing under the terms of the spatial dispersal policy.
Finally, we include only individuals aged 18-59, because individuals outside this age range
are unlikely to search for a job.
For each individual we have monthly information on labour market state. Moreover, we
know the individual’s municipality of residence (at the end of each year) and the date of the
last residential move (by the end of each year). This allows us to construct the ﬁrst non-
employment spell and hence the time until ﬁrst job, and all residential spells prior to the
ﬁrst job for each individual. Employment covers labour market states such as employment
as wage-earner, self-employment and assistant spouse, but excludes participation in active
labour market programmes and leave schemes. We ignore residential moves within a
municipality.
Descriptive statistics on the non-employment and residential spells are shown in Table
I. Note that 52% of men and 34% of women ﬁnd employment in the observation period,
on average 39 months after immigration. Note further that 32% of residential spells for
men and 26% of residential spells for women are completed, on average after 21 months
of residence.
Further investigation of features of the spells (not reported in Table I) shows the
following. First, on average the ﬁrst employment spell lasts a year and it exceeds 3
months for 70% of the individuals. Second, 33% of men and 27% of women have moved
at least once before ﬁnding their ﬁrst job and 9 % of men and 5% of women have moved
at least twice before ﬁnding their ﬁrst job.
15Table I
Descriptive statistics on non-employment and residential spells.
Sub sample Non-employment spell Frequency Distr. (%) Mean duration
MEN Completed 8,896 52.4 37.8 (28.9)
Right-censored 8,083 47.6 53.1 (37.8)
All 16,979 100 45.1 (34.3)
WOMEN Completed 3,727 33.6 40.4 (31.1)
Right-censored 7,350 66.4 50.1 (36.1)
All 11,077 100 46.8 (34.8)
Residential spells
MEN Completed 7,990 31.8 19.5 (18.4)
Right-censored 16,802 68.2 34.5 (28.6)
All 24,792 100 29.7 (26.7)
WOMEN Completed 3,799 25.7 22.7 (21.0)
Right-censored 11,013 74.3 39.3 (30.7)
All 14,812 100 35.0 (29.4)
Notes: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
The empirical hazard functions for exit to ﬁrst job and for exit from the initial mu-
nicipality of residence are shown separately for men and women in Figures I and II. The
empirical hazard function for exit to ﬁrst job attains its maximum in month 18 for men
and month 17 for women, while the empirical hazard function for exit from the initial
municipality of residence peaks in month 13 for both men and women. The empirical
survivor functions for ﬁrst non-employment spell and residence in the initial municipality
are shown separately for men and women in Figures III and IV. The ﬁrst ﬁgure shows
that after 12 years 18% of men and 32% of women will not have found a job. The second
ﬁgure shows that after 12 years 40% of men and 50% of women will still live in the initial
municipality.
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Kaplan meier hazard function for exit from 




















WomenWe now turn to description of the initial geographical settlement and relocation pattern
of individuals in our sample. Denmark is divided into 275 municipalities which vary
extensively in number of inhabitants. The four largest municipalities have more than
100,000 inhabitants. They cover at least parts of the four largest cities in Denmark:
Copenhagen, Aarhus, Odense and Aalborg. 132 municipalities have between 10,000 and
100,000 inhabitants. We refer to these as medium-sized. They cover mainly urban areas.
Finally, 139 municipalities have less than 10,000 inhabitants and are referred to as small.
They cover both smaller urban areas and rural districts. In the 1990s, 18% of the Danish
population lived in small municipalities, 61% in medium-sized municipalities and 21% in
large municipalities. Individuals in our sample were initially slightly overrepresented in
the large municipalities and slightly underrepresented in the small municipalities.
Turning to the relocation pattern of individuals in our sample, the relocation rates
out of the initial municipality of residence decreases with municipality size. This may
indicate that individuals’ relocation decisions were aﬀected by the size of municipality
of assignment. In contrast, the net inﬂow of movers is increasing with municipality size.
In fact, only large municipalities experience a positive net-inﬂow of movers. In sum,
secondary migration of unemployed refugees increased the concentration of unemployed
refugees in the larger municipalities.
V.B. Explanatory Variables
The job oﬀer arrival rate in a given region is likely to be aﬀected by a number of
local labour market characteristics and the reservation values are likely to be aﬀected by
both local labour market and housing characteristics. Therefore, we include a number
of municipality-speciﬁc variables. The variable deﬁnitions and primary data sources are
given in Table A.I and their ﬁrst two moments are shown in Table A.II in the Appendix.
We expect the regional unemployment rate to be a key variable, inﬂuencing the regional
job oﬀer arrival rate negatively. Another factor which may inﬂuence the regional job oﬀer
arrival rate is the extent to which local councils co-operate with local ﬁrms with respect to
qualifying refugees for the host-country labour market, for instance by use of private job
training programmes as part of active labour market programmes. The extent to which
such a co-operation takes place is unobserved to us, but it is believed to be systematically
related to the share of right-wing versus left-wing representation in the local councils,
and therefore we include the share of right-wing votes at the latest local election in the
empirical analysis.
A labour market characteristic of potential importance for the reservation wage is the
share of the county’s jobs located in the municipality in which a person lives. A higher
share of the county’s jobs could increase the local job oﬀer acceptance rate due to a
higher arrival rate of jobs with low commuting costs for which the individual sets a lower
18reservation wage than for jobs with high commuting costs.
Turning to housing market factors which may inﬂuence the rate of relocation out of a
given municipality, we expect the local residence oﬀer arrival rate to be increasing with
the number of social housing units in per cent of the total local housing stock. A higher
share of social housing units may reduce the relocation rate out of the municipality, since
adjustment of housing consumption can take place within the current local area.
We argue in the following that current place utility of recent refugees increases with
the local number of co-ethnics and immigrants, local access to vocational educational
institutions and local access to amenities oﬀered by larger cities. Recent immigrants may
derive high place utility from living close to co-ethnics for the following two reasons.
First, recent immigrants are likely to have limited information about the host country
whereas ethnic enclaves constitute well-known cultural, social and economic environments
which facilitate their adjustment to the new society [Piore 1979; Kobrin and Speare
1983]. Speciﬁcally, residence in an ethnic enclave strengthens feelings of security, solidarity
and identity within the group due to the common cultural background. Furthermore,
the local ethnic network may establish social institutions that support its members in
relation to the rest of the society. In addition, local ethnic labour markets may develop
further employment opportunities. Finally, the ethnic network may convey information
about employment opportunities outside the residential area. Second, living near ethnic
enclaves helps to reduce the costs of consumption of so-called ethnic goods deﬁned as
the consumption characteristics of an ethnic group not shared with the host population,
broadly deﬁned to include market and non-market goods and services, including social
interactions for themselves and their children with people of the same origin [Chiswick
and Miller 2005].
We believe the current place utility to be increasing in the size of the local population,
because recent immigrants tend to settle in larger cities [Bartel 1989], which may be
due to a preference for residing near airports which facilitate contact with old networks
abroad, due to access to a large variety of goods and services in general and due to the
local population being more accustomed to interactions with foreigners.
New refugees are likely to prefer living in a local area with many institutions for
vocational and higher education for numerous reasons. First, due to lack of education
from the source country. Second, due to lack of approval of foreign educations in the
host country. Third, due to a need for upgrading the skill level for employability in the
host country labour market, for instance due to a high minimum wage and a mismatch
between low-skilled job demand and supply in the host country.
Finally, to control for individual-speciﬁcd i ﬀerences in hazard rates, some of which
may be due to the observed individual-speciﬁcd i ﬀerences in initial settlement, we include
a number of demographic and socio-economic variables available in the administrative
19registers as controls: age, marital status, number of children, country of origin, and year
of immigration, as well as years of education. These variables are also deﬁn e di nT a b l e
A.I and their ﬁrst two moments are shown in Table A.II in the Appendix.
VI. Policy Evaluation
We now turn to evaluating the employment eﬀects of the Danish spatial dispersal policy
in force 1986-1998. To this end we have estimated the timing-of-events model described
in Section IV. The model is estimated separately for men and women to allow their job
search process to be driven by diﬀerent factors. The estimated hazard functions are
plotted in Figures A.I and A.II in the Appendix, for an individual with mean observable
and unobservable characteristics. The corresponding estimated survivor functions are
plotted in Figures A.III and A.IV in the Appendix. In this section, we describe the main
results of the estimated models.7
VI.A. How Location Characteristics Aﬀect Employment
Our results conﬁrm that the local labour market characteristics signiﬁcantly aﬀect the
speed at which refugees ﬁnd their ﬁrst job, see Table II. Initial settlement in regions with
high unemployment harms employment prospects of refugees. A percentage point increase
in the regional unemployment rate is associated with a 2.6% - (exp(−0.0266) − 1)·100 -
decrease in the hazard rate into ﬁrst job for men and a 1.7% decrease in the hazard rate
into ﬁrst job for women. The interpretation is that high regional unemployment implies a
low job oﬀer arrival rate. The percentage of county jobs in the municipality of residence
has a small, but signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on the hazard rate into ﬁrst job; a percentage
point increase is associated with a 0.5% increase in the hazard rate for men and with a
1.7% increase in the hazard rate for women. Similarly, the percentage of right-wing votes
at the latest local election is found to have a signiﬁcantly positive, although moderate,
eﬀect on the job ﬁnding hazard rate. This ﬁnding could be due to right-wing dominated
municipalities having more eﬃcient active labour market programmes for refugees due
to higher participation rates of unemployed refugees in private sector on-the-job training
rather than class room training as a result of closer cooperation with local ﬁrms compared
to left-wing dominated municipalities.
7The full set of estimation results are available on request.
20Table II
Estimated eﬀects of initial location characteristics on the hazard rate into ﬁrst job.
Sub sample: Men Women
Variable: Coeﬃcient Std. error Coeﬃcient Std. error
Reg. unemp. rate/100 -2.666** 0.654 -1.705 0.956
% of county jobs/100 0.521* 0.211 1.709** 0.310
% right-wing votes/100 1.092** 0.122 2.179** 0.186
Log(immigrants)/10 -2.601** 0.242 -3.514** 0.376
Greater Copenhagen area -0.158** 0.039 -0.008 0.058
Medium municipality 0.432** 0.068 0.661** 0.102
Small municipality 0.445** 0.094 0.718** 0.140
Log(co-ethnics)/10 0.420** 0.137 0.424* 0.209
No. of educ. institutions/100 2.688* 0.653 2.193* 0.947
% social housing/100 1.696** 0.152 2.860** 0.225
Notes: One and two asterisks indicate signiﬁcance of the estimate at the 5 and 1 % levels,
respectively. Controls for demographic and socio-economic characteristics and time-invariant
unobserved characteristics of the individual are included. In addition, selection into relocation
is taken into account.
More importantly, our results show that initial settlement in a municipality with many
immigrants is detrimental to employment outcomes of refugees. A percentage point in-
crease in the number of immigrants in the municipality of residence is associated with a
23% decrease in the hazard rate into ﬁrst job for men and a 30% decrease in the hazard
rate into ﬁrst job for women. A likely explanation may be that presence of immigrants
increases the probability of entry into the informal rather than the formal labour market.
Another explanation could be congestion; too many immigrants in one location may be
more than the local labour market can absorb due to excess supply of low-skilled labour.
However, further research into the causes of this negative correlation is needed.
Residence outside a large municipality is found to have a signiﬁcantly positive and
large eﬀect on the hazard rate into ﬁrst job. Speciﬁcally, the hazard rate for men is 54-
56% larger for individuals living in a small or medium-sized municipality than for similar
individuals who live in a large municipality. The eﬀects are larger for women. The hazard
rate into ﬁrst job is approximately twice as large for women who live in a small or medium-
sized municipality as for women who live in a large municipality. The interpretation of
the eﬀects of the size of the local population is not straightforward. It could be an
exposure eﬀect, i.e. the smaller the local population the more exposed the refugee is
to host-country culture and language. Similarly, residence in the greater Copenhagen
area versus residence outside that area has an additional signiﬁcant and negative eﬀect
21on the hazard rate into ﬁrst job for men, possibly for the same reason.The ﬁndings of
as i g n i ﬁcant, negative eﬀect of local population size and the presence of immigrants on
the hazard rate into ﬁrst job both support the assumption underlying dispersal policies,
that spatial dispersal of refugees away from immigrant-dense cities facilitates their labour
market assimilation.
However, interestingly the presence of co-ethnics in the municipality of residence has
as i g n i ﬁcant and positive eﬀect on the hazard rate into ﬁrst job. A percentage point
increase in the number of co-ethnics increases the hazard rate by 4.3% for both sexes. This
ﬁnding can be interpreted as evidence in favour of existence of positive ethnic network
eﬀects among co-ethnics, in particular that ethnic networks enhance the employment
opportunities by conveying information about employment opportunities or because jobs
are created within ethnic enclaves. However, in view of our theoretical model at least
part of the eﬀect may arise because an ethnic network locally increases place utility which
decreases the reservation wage with respect to local job oﬀers. We will develop this
argument further in Subsection VI.C. In any case, causes for this positive correlation
warrant further research.
Finally, the number of institutions for vocational and higher education and the share
of social housing in the municipality of residence is associated with a moderate, but
signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on the hazard rate into ﬁrst job for both men and women.
VI.B. Selection into Relocation
Our results conﬁrm that the local housing oﬀer arrival rate for which we use the
percentage of social housing in the total local housing stock as a proxy, inﬂuences the
relocation rate negatively, see Table III. The eﬀect is signiﬁcant but modest. A 1%
point increase in the percentage of social housing is associated with a 1% decrease in the
relocation rate out of the municipality.
We argued in Section V that current place utility is increasing with the local number
of co-ethnics and immigrants, local access to vocational institutions and local access to
amenities oﬀered by larger cities. Our results support the hypothesis. In particular, a
1% increase in the local number of immigrants signiﬁcantly decreases the relocation rate
by 9.5% for men and 17% for women. Similarly, a 1% increase in the local number of
co-ethnics signiﬁcantly decreases the hazard rate of relocation by 11% for men and 8%
for women. These ﬁndings are consistent with the hypothesis that place utility increases
with these two factors, which capture the importance of ethnic networks and ethnic goods.
Furthermore, compared to men who live in a large municipality, men residing in a medium
and a small municipality have a 33% and 84% higher relocation rate, respectively. For
women, the corresponding numbers are 66% and 102%, respectively. Surprisingly, the
relocation rate is also higher for individuals residing in the greater Copenhagen area com-
22pared to individuals outside that area. However, descriptive evidence (not reported here)
shows that this ﬁnding is mainly explained by high rates of relocation (between munici-
palities) within the greater Copenhagen area. Finally, as expected access to institutions
f o rv o c a t i o n a lo rh i g h e re d u c a t i o nh a san e g a t i v ee ﬀect on the relocation hazard rate,
however only insigniﬁcantly. Therefore, access to vocational or higher education does not
seem to be an important determinant of refugees’ place utility.
The regional unemployment rate, which is closely related to the job oﬀer arrival rate, is
found to have an insigniﬁcant eﬀect on the relocation hazard rate. Similarly, the eﬀect of
the share of the county job in the municipality of residence is found to be insigniﬁcantly
positive for men, but signiﬁcantly positive for women. The positive sign may be due
to the above-mentioned higher rates of migration within the greater Copenhagen area.
Interestingly, the eﬀect of the share of right-wing votes at the latest local election is
signiﬁcantly positive for men. This may suggest that the policy instruments used by
right-wing dominated municipalities have a side-eﬀe c ti nt h a tt h ei n s t r u m e n t sm a k es o m e
male refugees leave the municipality.
Table III
Estimated eﬀects of initial location characteristics on the hazard rate of relocation.
Sub sample: Men Women
Variable: Coeﬃcient Std. error Coeﬃcient Std. error
Reg. unemp. rate/100 -1.323 0.808 -0.317 1.129
% of county jobs/100 0.204 0.274 1.003* 0.435
% right-wing votes/100 0.467** 0.143 0.373 0.215
Log(immigrants)/10 -0.989** 0.291 -1.838** 0.439
Greater Copenhagen area 0.542** 0.050 0.560** 0.077
Medium municipality 0.287** 0.094 0.506** 0.148
Small municipality 0.609** 0.121 0.705** 0.184
Log(co-ethnics)/10 -1.190** 0.170 -0.824** 0.253
No. of educ. institutions/100 -1.192 0.862 -0.172 1.348
% social housing/100 -1.237** 0.185 -2.072** 0.289
First location 0.889** 0.039 1.332** 0.062
Notes: One and two asterisks indicate signiﬁcance of the estimate at the 5 and 1 % levels,
respectively. Controls for demographic and socio-economic characteristics and time-invariant
unobserved characteristics of the individual are included.
23Finally, note that residence in the assigned municipality implies a hazard rate of
r e l o c a t i o nw h i c hf o rm e ni sa sm u c ha s2 . 4t i m e sl a r g e rt h a nt h eh a z a r dr a t ef o rr e l o c a t i o n
out of subsequent municipalities of residence. The eﬀect is even larger for women, namely
3.8 times larger. A large, positive eﬀect could be expected given the initial random
assignment of around 90% of the individuals to a municipality of residence.
VI.C. The Causal Eﬀect of Relocation
Estimates of the average time-varying eﬀects of relocation on the hazard rate into
ﬁr s tj o ba r es h o w ni nT a b l eI V .T h ee ﬀects of the ﬁrst move and of more than one move
are estimated separately for 6 diﬀerent intervals of time since the move: 1-3 months, 4-6
months, 7-12 months, 13-18 months, 19-24 months and more than 24 months. For men,
relocation away from the assigned municipality on average has a signiﬁcantly positive
eﬀect on the hazard rate into ﬁrst job and the eﬀect tends to increase with time since the
move. On average, leaving the assigned municipality also has a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect
on the hazard rate into ﬁr s tj o bf o rw o m e n ,e x c e p ti nt h eﬁr s tt i m ei n t e r v a li nw h i c ht h e
eﬀect is close to zero. The time-varying eﬀect of moving twice relative to staying in the
assigned municipality is also signiﬁcantly positive in most time-intervals and increasing
with time since the second move.
For men, the hazard rate into the ﬁrst job increases by 24% 1-3 months after the ﬁrst
move, 68% 4-6 months after the ﬁrst move and around 58% from then on. For women,
the hazard rate into ﬁrst job increases by 0% 1-3 months after the ﬁrst move, 76% 4-6
months after the ﬁrst move and 47%-85% from then on. The average eﬀects of having
moved twice are slightly higher.
These positive eﬀects of carrying out a cross-municipal move are likely to stem at least
in part from the two following eﬀects. First, residence in a location of own choice after
the move may imply a lower local reservation wage due to increased place utility and
consequently a higher local job oﬀer acceptance rate. Second, diﬀerences in unobserved
location characteristics before and after the move, such as presence of friends and family
in the municipality of destination which can facilitate job search in the new local labour
market, may increase both the local job oﬀer arrival rate as well as place utility which
will increase the local job oﬀer acceptance rate through the local reservation wage eﬀect.
24Table IV
Estimated eﬀects of relocation on the hazard rate into ﬁrst job.
Sub sample: Men Women
Variable: Coeﬃcient Std. error Coeﬃcient Std. error
One move:
Move 0-3 months ago 0.216* 0.103 -0.016 0.215
Move 4-6 months ago 0.520** 0.091 0.568** 0.164
Move 7-12 months ago 0.489** 0.073 0.384** 0.139
Move 13-18 months ago 0.466** 0.078 0.589** 0.134
Move 19-24 months ago 0.464** 0.083 0.391** 0.153
Move > 24 months ago 0.408** 0.055 0.614** 0.088
Two moves:
Second move 0-3 months ago 0.374* 0.165 -0.018 0.447
Second move 4-6 months ago 0.270 0.181 0.814* 0.334
Second move 7-12 months ago 0.311* 0.136 0.212 0.319
Second move 13-18 months ago 0.564** 0.131 0.585* 0.293
Second move 19-24 months ago 0.504** 0.141 0.525 0.307
Second move > 24 months ago 0.568** 0.084 0.595** 0.154
Notes: One and two asterisks indicate signiﬁcance of the estimate at the 5 and 1 % levels,
respectively. Controls for demographic and socio-economic characteristics and time-invariant
unobserved characteristics of the individual and observed location characteristics are included.
In addition, selection into relocation is taken into account.
Since we only observe when an individual begins a job and not - which would have
been preferable - when an individual actually gets the job, one may worry that the positive
eﬀects at least in part stem from reverse causality; some movers may have found a job in
another region prior to moving to the region. However, if that was the case, we would
expect the hazard rate into ﬁrst job to be very high immediately after relocation and to
decline thereafter. Our estimates of the time-varying eﬀect of relocation on the hazard
rate into ﬁrst job show exactly the opposite. For both sexes, the two relocation eﬀects are
estimated to increase with time since the move. Furthermore, the ﬁrst relocation eﬀect
for men is estimated to be small 1-3 months after the move. Similarly, both relocation
eﬀects for women are estimated to be zero 1-3 months after the move.
Besides the relocation eﬀects reported in Table IV, relocation aﬀects the hazard rate
into ﬁrst job through changes in the observed location characteristics, i.e. if observed
characteristics of the municipality of destination diﬀer from those of the municipality of
origin. We refer to this relocation eﬀe c ta st h er e l o c a t i o ne ﬀect due to observables and to
25the relocation eﬀects reported in Table IV as the relocation eﬀects due to unobservables.


















denotes the mean of observed municipality characteristics across movers,
’before’ refers to the beginning of the ﬁrst residential spell and ’after’ refers to the time
immediately after relocation. Table V reports the relocation eﬀect due to observables for
the ﬁrst move and for two moves. On average, this eﬀect is negative, and for men it is
statistically signiﬁcant. For women, the eﬀects are insigniﬁcant at the 5% level. Hence,
(male) refugee migrants moved to locations with less favourable employment prospects
than in the assigned municipality. Speciﬁcally, the average eﬀect of changes in location
characteristics after the ﬁrst move corresponds to a decline in the hazard rate into ﬁrst
job by 12-13%. The average eﬀect of changes in location characteristics after two moves
is larger; it corresponds to a decline in the hazard rate into ﬁrst job by 19% for men
and 15% for women. The diﬀerence in the size of the relocation eﬀect due to observables
after one move and two moves is explained by the fact that relocations from a small or
medium-sized municipality to a large municipality constitute a larger share of second-time
relocations than ﬁrst-time relocations.
The total average eﬀect of relocation on the hazard rate into ﬁrst job is the sum of the
relocation eﬀect due to unobservables and the relocation eﬀect due to observables. Hence,
relative to no move the hazard rate into ﬁrst job for men increases by 8% 1-3 months
after the ﬁrst move, 46% 4-6 months after the ﬁrst move and around 38% from then on.
Relative to no move the hazard rate into ﬁrst job for women decreases by 15% in the ﬁrst
three months after the ﬁrst move, but 4-6 months after the ﬁr s tm o v ei ti n c r e a s e sb y5 1 %
and from 7 months after the ﬁr s tm o v ea n do n w a r d si tﬂuctuates between an increase of
26% and 59%. The total average eﬀects of having moved twice are similar. Thus, for men
the hazard rate into ﬁrst job is almost unchanged initially after relocation while it declines
for women, but a few months after relocation it increases to a level which signiﬁcantly
exceeds the hazard rate in the case of no relocation.
26Table V
The relocation eﬀect due to observables on the hazard rate into ﬁrst job.
Sub sample: No. of moves Relocation eﬀect due to observables
Eﬀect Std. error
MEN One -0.134 0.061
Two -0.212 0.068
WOMEN One -0.146 0.085
Two -0.167 0.088
Are relocation eﬀects of the estimated size also economically signiﬁcant? We can an-
swer this question by calculating the eﬀe c to fr e l o c a t i o no nt h ep r e d i c t e da v e r a g ed u r a t i o n
until the ﬁrst job is found. For a person with observed characteristics X and unobserved
characteristics
ˆ



















Table VI summarizes the estimated relocation eﬀects in the following way. First, we
calculate the predicted mean duration for an individual who does not move. Next, we
calculate the change in the predicted duration for two diﬀerent relocation scenarios: one
relocation 16 months after initial settlement and two relocations in months 16 and 31.
For an average man, the relocation eﬀects correspond to a decrease in predicted time
until ﬁrst job of 22 months for one relocation (corresponding to a 27% reduction) and 24
months for two relocations. For an average woman, the relocation eﬀects are even larger:
a 41 months decrease (corresponding to a 34% reduction) if she moves 16 months after
initial settlement and a 39 months decrease if she moves twice. All eﬀects are statistically
signiﬁcant. Refugees who move away from the municipality of assignment ﬁnd a job
faster than they would have otherwise, despite the fact that municipalities of assignment
have more favourable observed characteristics in terms of employment than municipalities
of destination. These results support the hypothesis that lack of free initial location
choice decreases current place utility which slows down employment assimilation due to
reservation wage eﬀects. Individuals with low place utility in the assigned municipality
postpone local job search or acceptance until they have found a satisfactory municipality
in which to reside, and then they lower their local reservation wage in order to ﬁnd local
employment.
27Table VI
Predicted mean duration and change in mean duration of ﬁr s tn o n - e m p l o y m e n ts p e l lf o r
an individual with mean observed characteristics. Months.
Predicted Predicted change in
mean duration mean duration
0m o v e s 1m o v e 2m o v e s
Sub sample: Unobserved type: Month 16 Months 16, 31
MEN Type 1 (
ˆ
vu=0 ) 58.5 (1.86) -14.4 (1.37) -15.4 (1.55)
Type 2 (
ˆ
vu= -1.018) 135.1 (8.00) -38.9 (3.87) -46.2 (4.54)
Average person 82.6 (2.84) -21.9 (2.06) -24.4 (2.51)
WOMEN Type 1 (
ˆ
vu=0 ) 97.0 (5.32) -30.5 (3.55) -29.1 (5.35)
Type 2 (
ˆ
vu= -0.920) 206.2 (21.92) -77.4 (7.97) -74.2 (13.60)
Average person 122.6 (6.73) -41.3 (4.27) -39.3 (7.54)
Notes: An average male person is 0.45 · type1+0 .55 · type2. An average female person is
0.571·type1+0.429·type2. Standard errors calculated by Monte Carlo methods are reported
in parentheses.
VI.D. Simulation Results: A Case for Abandonment of Spatial Dispersal
The estimated model can be used to predict the time until ﬁrst job for an individual
in the counterfactual case of no spatial dispersal policy, i.e. for an individual who is
unrestricted in initial and subsequent residential choice. Obviously, such a calculation
entails many assumptions, and it should therefore be interpreted cautiously. Nevertheless,
we feel that it can provide instructive information of use for policy makers.
We calculate the predicted time until ﬁrst job for an individual with mean demographic
and socio-economics characteristics under three diﬀerent sets of assumptions about the
counterfactual distribution of refugees across municipalities and compare it with the pre-
dicted time until ﬁrst job for an individual with average demographic and socio-economic
characteristics who stays in a municipality with average municipality characteristics under
the dispersal policy. In scenario 1, we assume that all newly arrived refugees settle and re-
main settled in one of the four largest municipalities in Denmark. In addition, we assume
that each municipality share corresponds to its share of the net-inﬂow of all immigrants
(mainly refugees and family-reuniﬁed immigrants) to large municipalities in 1984. This
scenario can be regarded as a worst case scenario, since it counterfactually assumes that
all newly arrived refugees settle and remain settled in a large city while in fact it was only
52% of the net-inﬂow of immigrants that settled in one of the large municipalities in 1984.
In scenario 2, we keep the ﬁrst assumption but relax the second assumption and instead
assume that the share of refugees that settle in each large municipality corresponds to
28the actual municipality share of the 1984 cohort of refugees that settled in a large munic-
ipality. Finally, in scenario 3 we relax both of the strong assumptions made in scenario
1. Instead of the ﬁrst assumption we assume that refugees settle and stay in a large or
medium-sized municipality. 97.4% of the 1984 cohort of refugees did in fact initially settle
in either a large or a medium-sized municipality. We divide medium-sized municipalities
in two categories: medium-sized municipalities within the greater Copenhagen area and
those outside. We assume that the municipality (category) share of refugees corresponds
to the actual municipality (category) share of the 1984 cohort of refugees who initially
settled in a large or medium-sized municipality. This is likely to be the most realistic
scenario.
In each scenario, refugees are distributed across municipalities by making random
draws from the relevant distribution, and subsequently mean location characteristics in-
cluding mean number of immigrants and co-ethnics are recalculated before the expected
durations are calculated.
In Table VII, we report the change in expected duration under each scenario relative
to stayers under the dispersal policy. Looking at the simulation results for scenarios 1-3,
we ﬁnd that removal of the dispersal policy leads to an increase in the average time until
ﬁrst job. The impact is signiﬁcant under scenarios 1 and 2, while the eﬀects are very
small and insigniﬁcant under scenario 3.
In scenarios 1-3, we ignore that free location choice may increase place utility which
according to our theoretical model will increase the overall job-ﬁnding rates through
reservation wage eﬀe c t s . W ea l l o wf o rt h i sp o t e n t i a le ﬀect in scenarios 4-6 which are
otherwise replications of scenarios 1-3. In particular, we assume that the eﬀect of free
location choice on the hazard rate into ﬁrst job corresponds to the average relocation eﬀect
due to unobservables. This amounts to assuming that the estimated relocation eﬀect due
to unobservables on the hazard rate into ﬁrst job reﬂect either unobserved municipality
characteristics or reservation wage eﬀects rather than the event of relocation itself. Under
this additional assumption, removal of the dispersal policy signiﬁcantly decreases the
expected time until ﬁrst job in all scenarios.
The true counterfactual is likely to lie somewhere between those measured by the
scenarios 3 and 6, hence, it is tempting to conclude that the Danish spatial dispersal
policy 1986-1998 has not promoted employment assimilation of refugees. In contrast, it is
likely to have harmed the employment assimilation process because a signiﬁcant number
of placed refugees may have been reluctant to accept a local job oﬀer due to low place
utility in the assigned municipality.
29Table VII
Predicted change in mean duration of ﬁrst non-employment spell for an individual with
mean observed characteristics in absence of a spatial dispersal policy. Months.
Change in expected duration
relative to stayers under scenario
Sub sample: Unobs. heterogeneity: 123
MEN Type 1 (
ˆ
vu=0 ) 12.2 (4.0) 10.1 (3.7) 0.9 (0.7)
Type 2 (
ˆ
vu= -1.018) 31.6 (10.7) 26.1 (9.4) 2.3 (1.9)
Average person 17.9 (6.0) 15.0 (5.7) 1.3 (1.1)
WOMEN Type 1 (
ˆ
vu=0 ) 23.4 (10.7) 26.9 (12.1) 2.2 (1.9)
Type 2 (
ˆ
vu= -0.920) 53.3 (22.8) 57.7 (20.6) 5.2 (3.9)
Average person 31.5 (14.4) 34.4 (14.8) 3.0 (2.2)
456
MEN Type 1 (
ˆ
vu=0 ) -7.7 (2.9) -9.6 (3.2) -15.9 (3.7)
Type 2 (
ˆ
vu= -1.018) -19.7 (8.9) -24.1 (8.1) -38.8 (8.9)
Average person -11.6 (4.6) -14.0 (5.0) -23.2 (5.3)
WOMEN Type 1 (
ˆ
vu=0 ) -21.5 (8.4) -19.4 (9.3) -34.4 (12.2)
Type 2 (
ˆ
vu= -0.920) -51.1 (20.6) -46.7 (20.8) -79.9 (26.0)
Average person -28.5 (12.8) -26.7 (12.3) -45.7 (16.3)
Notes: An average male person is 0.45 · type1+0 .55 · type2. An average female person is
0.571·type1+0.429·type2. Municipality shares used in each scenario are as follows. Scenarios
1 and 4: Copenhagen: 0.601, Aarhus: 0.221, Odense: 0.082, Aalborg: 0.097. Scenarios 2 and 5:
Copenhagen: 0.337, Aarhus: 0.362, Odense: 0.078, Aalborg: 0.224. Scenarios 3 and 6: Copen-
hagen: 0.208, Aarhus: 0.138, Odense: 0.048, Aalborg: 0.137, medium-sized municipalities in the
greater Copenhagen area: 0.085, medium-sized municipalities outside the greater Copenhagen
area: 0.298. Standard errors calculated by Monte Carlo methods are reported in parentheses.
VII. Concluding remarks
Spatial dispersal policies may inﬂuence labour market assimilation of refugees through
two mechanism, ﬁrst, by aﬀecting the job oﬀer arrival rate in the local labour market since
it depends on regional characteristics, and second, by aﬀecting initial place utility, which
depends on neighbourhood characteristics. We have constructed a partial search model in
which non-employed individuals search simultaneously for a job and a better location of
residence in order to investigate the eﬀect of place utility on job search theoretically. Our
model predicts that the transition rate into local employment increases with place utility
30while the transition rate into employment outside the local labour market decreases with
place utility. We argue that spatial dispersal policies are likely to decrease average place
utility of newly arrived refugees; ﬁrst, due to lack of free location choice; second, because
place utility tends to increase with the local number of co-ethnics and immigrants, local
access to vocational institutions and local access to amenities oﬀered by larger cities. By
decreasing place utility of newly arrived refugees, spatial dispersal policies are likely to
decrease overall transition rates into ﬁrst job.
We test these predictions in the context of the Danish spatial dispersal policy on
refugees in force from 1986 until 1998. Under this policy refugees were randomly assigned
to locations conditional on a few observed characteristics. Our empirical results show that
refugees assigned to locations outside immigrant-dense cities had a higher hazard rate into
ﬁrst job than refugees assigned to immigrant-dense cities. However, refugees assigned to
locations outside immigrant-dense cities also had a signiﬁcantly higher hazard rate of
relocation than refugees within these cities. In particular, the relocation rate was found
to decrease with the local number of co-ethnics and immigrants and local population size.
Moreover, for movers relocation away from the assigned municipality increases the hazard
rate into ﬁrst job, even though the destination municipalities on average are characterised
by less favourable employment conditions. The eﬀect of relocation is small initially, but
increases with time spent in the new municipality. This ﬁnding rules out reverse causality.
We interpret the positive eﬀect of relocation as evidence of an improvement of unobserved
location characteristics, e.g. presence of an ethnic network. These unobserved factors may
not only increase the local job oﬀer arrival rate, but may also increase the local job oﬀer
acceptance rate by increasing place utility.
Simulation results show that under reasonable assumptions about the counterfactual
distribution of refugees across locations in absence of the dispersal policy, the employment
eﬀect of assignment to locations outside immigrant-dense cities is posititive but insigniﬁ-
cant. In contrast, the employment eﬀect of lack of free initial location choice is negative
and possibly large. As a consequence, removal of the dispersal policy would not harm the
employment assimilation process of refugees, but might in fact promote it.
Overall, these results speak against using mandatory spatial dispersal policies to pro-
mote labour market assimilation of refugees. Furthermore, they strongly speak against
spatial dispersal policies that restrict secondary migration of refugees, e.g. by making
social beneﬁts entitlement conditional on residence in the assigned municipality. This
type of relocation restriction is an inherent part of the current Danish dispersal policy in
practise since 1999.
Instead of mandatory spatial dispersal policies we recommend a voluntary spatial
dispersal of refugees across locations with low regional unemployment, a high percentage
of county jobs, institutions for vocational and higher education and many co-ethnics. By
31making dispersed settlement voluntary, place utility increases and as a result the transition
rate into local employment increases.
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Appendix
Table A.I reports the deﬁnitions and primary sources of data for the variables used
in the empirical analysis. Information on gender, age and marital status come from
population registers, Statistics Denmark. Their deﬁntions are obvious and are therefore
not given in Table A.I.
Table A.II presents means and standard deviations of the variables used in the empir-
ical analysis.
35Table A.I
Variable definitions and primary sources of data. Part A.
Variable Definition Primary source of data
Individual characteristics
Children aged 0-2 Dummy for presence of children  Population register,
between 0 and 2 years of age Statistics Denmark (DST)
in the household
Children aged 3-17 Dummy for presence of children Population register, DST. 
between 3 and 17 years of age
in the household
Country of origin Dummy for immigrant source country Population register, DST. 
Year of immigration Dummy for first year of receipt Population register, DST. 
of residence permit
Years of education Number of years of education prior Surveybased register on
to immigration constructed from immigrants' education level 
an education code of highest attained prior to immigration,
degree attained prior to immigration Statistics Denmark (DST). 
Ethnic stock Number of immigrants and Population register, DST. 
descendants of immigrants from Author's calculations based on
immigrant source country in Denmark 100 per cent sample of immigrants.
Municipality characteristics
Greater Copenhagen Copenhagen and Frederiksberg Population register, DST. 
County Municipality and
Copenhagen County
Large municipality Municipality with at least  Population statistics
100,000 inhabitants (population counted data), DST. 
Medium municipality Municipality with 10,000-99,999  Population statistics
inhabitants  (population counted data), DST. 
Small municipality Municipality with less than 10,000 Population statistics
inhabitants (population counted data), DST. Table A.I
Variable definitions and primary sources of data. Part B.
Variable Definition Primary source of data
No. of immigrants Number of immigrants and descendants Population register, DST. 
of immigrants in municipality j Author's calculations based on
100 per cent sample of immigrants.
No. of co-ethnics Number of immigrants and descendants  Population register, DST. 
of immigrants from source country k Author's calculations based on
residing in municipality j 100 per cent sample of immigrants.
Regional unemployment rate The unemployment rate in a radius  Unemployment register
of DKK 60 (approx. USD 10)  (population counted data), DST,
of transport around the largest  and cost of transport statistics, 
post office in municipality j the Ministry of Transport.
Constructed by Local
Government Studies.
% of county jobs Number of individuals employed Registerbased labour force
in municipality j in per cent of statistics (population counted
 the total number of individuals  data), DST.
employed in the county
No. of educ. institutions Number of institutions for vocational  Integrated pupil register 
and higher education in municipality j (population counted data), DST.
% social housing Number of social housing dwellings Buildings and housing statistics
for all-year residence in per cent of the (population counted data), DST.
total number of dwellings
for all-year residence in municipality j 
% right-wing votes Sum of votes for the Liberal Party and Election statistics, DST. 
the Conservative People's Party in per 
cent of the sum of votes for the Liberal 
Party, the Conservative People's Party,
the Social Democratic Party and
the Socialist People's Party 
at the latest municipal election.
The two former parties are traditional, 
right-wing parties whereas the latter 
two are traditional, left-wing parties.Table A.II
Summary Statistics.Mean of Initial Values. Part A.
Sub sample: Men Women
Variables (N=16,979) (N=11,077)
Age 29.19 (9.29) 31.56 (10.48)
Married 0.40 (0.49) 0.72 (0.45)
Children aged 0-2 0.15 (0.35) 0.26 (0.44)
Children aged 3-17 0.28 (0.45) 0.52 (0.50)
Country of origin:
Poland 0.01 (0.11) 0.03 (0.16)
Iraq 0.14 (0.34) 0.09 (0.28)
Iran 0.16 (0.36) 0.12 (0.33)
Vietnam 0.05 (0.22) 0.07 (0.26)
Sri Lanka 0.10 (0.30) 0.06 (0.23)
No citizenship 0.17 (0.38) 0.14 (0.35)
Ethiopia 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.08)
Afghanistan 0.02 (0.13) 0.02 (0.13)
Somalia 0.05 (0.22) 0.06 (0.23)
Rumania 0.01 (0.08) 0.01 (0.10)
Chile 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.04)
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0.26 (0.44) 0.37 (0.48)
Ex-Yugoslavia (excl. BH) 0.01 (0.07) 0.01 (0.09)
Yugoslavia 0.01 (0.12) 0.02 (0.07)
38Table A.II
Summary Statistics. Mean of Initial Values. Part B.
Sub sample: Men Women
Variables (N=16,979) (N=11,077)
Year of immigration:
1985 0.05 (0.21) 0.03 (0.16)
1986 0.18 (0.39) 0.09 (0.29)
1987 0.08 (0.26) 0.07 (0.26)
1988 0.06 (0.25) 0.05 (0.22)
1989 0.07 (0.25) 0.06 (0.24)
1990 0.05 (0.21) 0.05 (0.22)
1991 0.05 (0.23) 0.06 (0.23)
1992 0.06 (0.24) 0.06 (0.25)
1993 0.05 (0.21) 0.05 (0.22)
1994 0.03 (0.18) 0.04 (0.18)
1995 0.32 (0.47) 0.44 (0.50)
1996 0.00 (0.01) 0 (0)
Years of education 4.81 (6.28) 4.68 (5.97)
Years of education missing 0.61 (0.49) 0.60 (0.49)
Ethnic stock 8,507 (5,406) 10,164 (5,429)
Municip. of residence:
Greater Copenhagen 0.16 (0.37) 0.16 (0.37)
Large municipality 0.26 (0.44) 0.25 (0.43)
Medium municipality 0.60 (0.49) 0.61 (0.49)
Small municipality 0.14 (0.34) 0.14 (0.35)
No. of immigrants 8,184 (16,362) 7,682 (15,463)
No. of co-ethnics 255 (406) 289 (440)
Regional unemp. rate 9.80 (2.34) 10.09 (2.32)
% of county jobs 23.19 (25.35) 21.87 (24.10)
No. of educ. institutions 8.01 (9.79) 7.54 (9.38)
% social housing 19.63 (11.06) 20.33 (12.06)
%r i g h t - w i n gv o t e s 41.97 (13.08) 42.43 (13.24)
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
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